5. Summary

The most important characteristics of educational administration in Hungary are the shared responsibilities and the high degree of local autonomy within the framework of national level regulations. These characterise all functions of public education from teacher employment to the definition of educational content, from developmental decision-making to regulating student flows, and from quality assurance to financial administration in general. The proper operation of the system presupposes that the various actors co-operate and that they interpret the regulations and the conditions in a similar way.

The autonomy and responsibility of the local actors has considerably enhanced the adaptivity and innovative capacity of the Hungarian public education system, and thus helped that is could adapt itself quickly and successfully to the changing needs of the society. Within the economic decline and public restrictions this system proved to be especially useful in making it possible that external resources could be brought into the system and it encouraged local initiatives (both on community and individual levels). Shared responsibility in education played a very positiv role in the development of local democracy and in that of the individual responsibility in Hungary. The competition among schools contributed to the rise of quality in the education service, and also to programme choice. For the customers of the education service it enhanced the freedom of choice.

The experiences of the last years have proved that this system can basically guarantee that the most important objectives of public education are realised, though there are some serious problems in relation with certain functions and objectives. For example, the realisation of equity proves to be difficult in several areas, and there are problems in a lot of fields with the assurance of quality and the efficient use of resources as well. The great variety of programmes together with the inefficiencies of regulations weaken the transparency of the system at many points, and it can lead to the restriction of the basic rights of the costumers.

According to the analyses, these problems do not usually stem from the definitions of the responsibilities, but rather from the lack of adequate tools or interests of the main actors. The responsibility relations are regulated in a fairly detailed and coherent way in the legislation currently in force in Hungary. What occurs is that there is no responsibility allocated to certain functions, or responsibilities are allocated to actors who cannot even in the long run be given the tools that would enable them to exercise their responsibility, or cannot be made interested in the exercising of the responsibility at a proper level of quality.

It is a much more common problem among the ones noticed that the actors do not possess the tools that would be necessary for exercising their responsibility. In most of these cases the tools can be created by proper development or regulation but there are cases - as we have seen - where the revision of the allocation of the given responsibility could mean the solution. The missing tool is often a financial resource, the granting of which will depend on the pace of economic development, on the size of the moneys available for public expenditure, on the budgetary position of education and on the size of the private sources that can be drawn into education. In a large number of cases it is not the lack of resources that we have to notice but the lack of information and preparation, which can be remedied through the development of the communication and information systems and by training. One of the most important sources of problems in Hungary is obviously the relative underdevelopment of the communication, information and feedback mechanisms without which no decentralised system can operate efficiently.

It is not unusual either that those responsible do possess the necessary tools, yet, due to a lack of interest or to the shortages of accountability, they do not act upon their responsibility at all or not as they should. Since the actors of the Hungarian system usually respond fairly well to the different financial stimulants there are a variety of ways to employ such stimulants. The possibilities for direct, administrative accountability are limited because of the decentralised character of the system but the system so far has not even relied on the possibilities that are already given, such as the force of publicity in making people accountable.

The problems identified seem to be generally solvable within the given system of shared responsibilities. There are only few questions where the responsibility should be re-allocated to another actor, and there are only one or two actors for whom new responsibilities should be determined. At the same time, there are a high number of questions where the actors exercising the responsibilities should be provided with the proper tools and where stimulants should be created that would make the actors to actually carry out their responsibility.

Finally, it is important to emphasise that though the Hungarian system of shared responsibilities is the result of a long development the period of transition is by no means over. Several elements of the system are too novel for the actors so they cannot yet possess the knowledge and skills that are necessary for acting upon their responsibilities, or they have not yet developed the new techniques of co-operation and control that are the pre-requisites for the successful operation of the system. The progress of the learning process involved - especially if it is aided by a conscious policy - may significantly improve the capacity of the system to realise the salient objectives of public education. This is why the improvement of communication, the increase of learning possibilities and the teaching of co-operation techniques in general may play a significant role in all areas in the solution of problems.